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Abstract  
This paper describes the "forced return" of 
Russian and Russian-speaking peoples in 
the new "Republics" to Russia as a 
consequence of the collapse of the USSR. 
Although these migrations bear all the 
earmarks of a refugee displacement, they 
do not fall within the legitimate definitions 
offorced migration. Consequently,' these 
individuals are forced to endure all the 
trauma of displacement without recourse 
to the normative international or human 
rights remedies. The author suggests that 
two new categories, "returnees" and 
"returning migrants" be delineated to meet 
the needs of these individuals. Several 
examples of forced return are described in 
the paper to clarify the parameters of the 
problem and illustrate the consequences.  
Precis  
Ce texte decrit Ie "retour force" des per-
sonnes de nationalite ou de langue russe 
des nouvelles "Republiques" vers la Rus-
sie comme consequence de l' 
effondrement de 1'URSS. Bien que ces 
migrations presentent toutes les 
caracteristiques de la migration forcee 
des refugies, elles n' entren t pas dans la 
definition traditionnelle de la migration 
forcee. Par consequent, ces individus sont 
contraints d' assumer les traumatismes de 
telles relocalisations sans pouvoir 
invoquer les remedes du droit 
international humanitaire. L' auteur 
suggere que deux nouvelles categories, 
"returnees" et "returning migrants" soient 
crees pour repondre aux besoins de ces 
individus. Plusieurs exempIes de retours 
fdrces sont donnes dans Ie texte afin de 
clarifier les parametres du probleme et en 
illustrer les consequences.  
One of the most dramatic consequences 
of the collapse of the USSR is the prob-  
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lem of refugees and forced migrants 
leaving the former Soviet republics to 
settle in Russia. The most widespread 
phenomenon in this forced migration 
appears to be the exodus of Russians as 
well as Russian-speaking peoples from 
what Russian politicians call the "near 
Abroad," referring to the former Soviet 
republics.  
Despite the fact that this migratory 
flow seems to be a classic case of mere 
repatriation from the perspective of in-
ternationallaw, it however displays the 
very characteristics of forced migration.  
Yet, there is no corresponding concept 
in international law, and, since they have 
not either left their home country or fled 
to Russia, forced migrants do not usually 
fall within the traditional concept of 
"refugee"l or that of "internally displaced 
person."2 From a juridical and legitimate 
perspective, this issue is but a Russian 
Federation concern. Like the 
International Community, the 
"traditional" international organizations 
in charge of helping refugees, do not 
have the legal right to take care of them.  
Yet, even if the status of a "forced 
migrant" is differentfrom that of a" refu-
gee" in terms of international law, their 
material deprivation and their living 
conditions are so similar that it might be 
interesting to study that legal specificity. 
Thus, one may ask that question: Is the 
Russian law regarding forced migrants 
adapted to the extent and seriousness of 
the issue? It might very well reveal the 
lack of political willingness of Russian 
authorities to get involved in the 
problem. Hence this creates a 
discriminatory situation as regards forced 
migrants, which does not abide the 
requirements of human rights.  
Twenty-Five Million Russians in  
Quest of a Lost Fatherland  
Due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
some 25 million Soviet citizens became  
 
almost overnight Russians settled in a 
foreign country and the living symbols of 
a rejected regime.3  
In a way, that sudden through passive 
paradoxical expatriation had been foretold 
for several years by growing anti-Russian 
feeling within the republics. In 1990, one 
could witness violent demonstrations 
against the Russians all over the country, 
from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and 
Moldova to Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Tajikistan. According to the statistics, 
some 200,000 Russians flew from 
Uzbekistan during that year.4 The Soviet 
Far Eastwas affected as well. In the 
remote autonomous republic of Tuvas, 
near the Mongolian border, the Russian 
exodus from the region culminated that 
same year, as the acts of violence towards 
them were getting more serious and more 
frequ~nt.  
Obviously, the process of migration 
knew an even more dramatic surge after 
the events of 1991.  
It has been often and rightfully said 
that the collapse of the Soviet Union 
caused an even greater trauma for the 
Russians than for the other peoples who 
were once part of the Union. When its fall 
meant for the latter the return to a long 
denied sovereignty, it indeed belittled the 
Russians from the status of "Primus inter 
Pares country" to that of a decaying power 
on the verge of sinking into the Third 
World. The trauma certainly proved even 
more profound for those "Russian of the 
Empire." All the former "Plan migrants" 
who had been sent in the republics under 
the framework of the Soviet Plan and who 
benefited there from a privileged status 
suddenly became refugees-or at least 
regarded as such, "We did become refu. 
gees almost overnight. We are not the 
ones who left our country. It is our fa-  
therland who forsook us."s The very use 
of the word "refugee" to qualify those 
people who had not already left the re-
publics where they used to live, the way  
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this term was turned into account, 
showed how sound the bitterness oithe 
"Russians of the Empire" was. Some of 
them refused to adapt themselves to the 
new reality, but it was in no way easier 
for the rest to "go back" to that Russia 
most of them had never lived in.  
Many of them were left aghast at the 
failed coup of 1991. In a way, their situ-
ation could be compared to that of the 
Algerians of European origin in the 
months following the signing of the 1962 
EvianAgreement.  
In the parent state itself (i.e., the newly 
born Federation of Russia), the current 
changes stirred questioning and thought 
over the role of the "Motherland" both in 
the press and the political circles.  
The "Russians of the Empire" took 
advantage of the democratization of the 
political system and the liberalization of 
inforrna tion to voice their concern or 
their despair, and the power was, in a 
sense, called upon to answer for the 
situation. The authorities were gradually 
compelled to react, as their Russian 
brothers from the republics were now 
directly threatened by massive migration.  
In the meantime, the fall of the USSR 
cleared the situation. As long as the 
Soviet Union existed, it was hard for the 
central power to deal with internal con-
flicts, since the "question of nationalities" 
had been officially settled. This proved 
easier when the sovereignty of the 
republics was proclaimed and ac-
knowledged; the "responsibility" for the 
flows of refugees was to be shared 
between the former Soviet republics.  
The Legal Framework  
The law on Refugees was signed on 19 
February 1993, and came into force on 20 
March. The law on Forced Migrants was 
signed on 20 December 1995 and 
implemented on 28 December. 6 The first 
one defined the provision concerning the 
access to the status of refugee; the second 
one that of the status of forced migrant. 
When enforced, the texts were conflated 
with each other and it proved difficult to 
determine which law should apply to any 
specific case.  
The texts were both very similar and 
radically different. They were very simi-  
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lar to one another because most of the 
criteria defining the status of the refugee 
could be found in those of the forced 
migrant. As a matter of fact, these crite-
ria are those of the 1951 Geneva Con-
vention. The Russian law pertaining to 
refugees was not specific.  
But, as for the status of the forced 
migrant, the lawmakers added extra 
criteria in comparison with those of the 
refugee. Through that addition, Russia 
was taking care of the Russians wishing 
to leave the new independent states, not 
so much as a consequence of their being 
subject to persecution, but because the 
domestic situation in the republics would 
have deteriorated so seriously that it 
would have been impossible for the 
Russians to stay. This was for instance 
the case of the Russians living in 
Nagorno-Karabakh or in Abkhazia. More 
precisely, the texts made the distinction 
between two different categories based 
upon the concept of citizenship-a forced 
migrant was a Russian citizen or a former 
Soviet citizen living permanently on the 
territory of the Russian Federation and 
who fulfils the other provisions stated in 
the forced migrant laws. Moreover one 
must be aware of the factthatthe 
displaced persons within the Russian 
territory being also considered as forced 
migrants, this very category proves rather 
vague in comparison with traditional 
internationallaw.  
In theory, both texts made a distinc-
tion between both categories. But in 
practice, the definitions appeared to be 
somewhat loose as a consequence of 
political interpretations and interference 
with other laws. The progress made by 
these two laws, i.e. the definition of two 
distinct statuses, was partly ruined by 
legal and political issues.  
Even after the bills were passed, a 
great deal of politicians and civil servants 
kept on developing their own interpreting 
of the terms the lawmakers had decided 
to use. For instance, Yevgeni Chernitsov, 
the Government Spokesman, stated to the 
press that the people fleeing from 
Abkhazia during the war would be right 
away considered as refugees, whatever 
their citizenship.7  
 
Even more disconcerting, if not more 
serious, were the statements of Tatiana 
Regent, the head o(the Federal Migration 
Service (FMS), the most important 
agency in charge of the implementation 
of those laws. She too maintained con-
fusion over the meaning of both terms, 
arguing that the key distinction had to be 
that of people fleeing from an armed 
conflict zone. According to her, people 
leaving Tadjikistan for example had to be 
primarily viewed as refugees. On the 
other hand, the way she considered forced 
migrants was closer to the traditional 
definition of "economic migrants"-,-for 
instance the Armenians fleeing Armenia 
for Russia under economical pressure.8 
Hence the prevailing confusion within the 
FMS and particularly on the lowest level, 
in the local registration offices.  
But the key problem raised by these 
laws is that they both focus on the citi-
zenship of the petitioner. Considering 
Russian law as regards citizenship, this 
very clause appears to be inapplicable in 
most cases.  
As the "legal successor" of the USSR, 
the Federation of Russia passed a rather 
liberal law regarding citizenship. This 
text voted on 28 November 1991 and 
implemented on 6 February 1992 auto-
matically granted Russian citizenship to 
those who used to live permanently on 
the soil of the Federation before that date. 
As for the foreigners and the Stateless 
persons, they had to be living in Russia 
for five years to have access to 
citizenship, that period being reduced to 
two and a half years for the refugees. 
That law defined as well a period of three 
years, during which any former Soviet 
citizen living in a former republic before 
1 September 1991 could,9 upon request, 
have access to Russian citizenship in case 
she/he was not already a citizen of a post-
Soviet republic. After the three legal 
years, the former Soviet citizens had to 
apply for naturalization as any other 
foreigner.  
The aim of the lawmakers was to pre-
vent former Soviet citizens from becom-
ing stateless persons overnight, as a 
consequence of the fall of the USSR. But 
they also wanted to spare them the risk of 
be corning the scapegoats of the Newly  
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Independent States (NIS). This only 
proved true in Latvia and Estonia, but 
in November 1991 one could seriously 
fear that those NIS would pass very 
restrictive bills concerning citizenship.  
Actually, the period of three years 
was extended until 31 December 2000, 
thanks to an amendment passed by the 
Duma on 18 January 1995 and con-
firmed by Boris Yeltsin on 6 February 
1995.1°  
By the end of February 1995, some 
568,000 former Soviet citizens had ob-
tained Russian citizenship. All of them 
were not registered as refugees in Rus-
sia, but those who were became forced 
migrants thanks to their newly acquired 
Russian citizenship. The criteria de-
fined by the lawmakers in 1993 there-
fore proved inadequate since their 
implementation did not prevent the sta-
tus to adapt to the situation throughout 
the years. For instance, in 1993, it was 
still not clearly stated whether the 
44,400 Armenians and the 7,800 Azeris 
who had been registered as refugees in 
1992 were still considered as such or as 
forced migrants. 11 As itismore interest-
ing-in terms of material need-to be 
registered as a forced migrant since the 
government aid is more important than 
that granted to refugees, personal strat-
egies and individual choice added con-
fusion and vagueness to the current 
situation.  
As they became aware of the imper-
fection of the system, the Federal 
Migration Service tried to clarify the 
situation regarding the enforcement of 
the law. More precisely, they issued an 
exhaustive list of the reasons why 
someone could not be entitled to 
participate in the mentioned categories. 
The economic migrants or the victims 
of an ecological catastrophe could be 
refused the status of refugee or migrant. 
Yet, these restrictions are far from 
meeting unanimous opinion within the 
FMS, since the director herself, Tatiana 
Regent, already basically considers 
forced migrants as economic migrants.  
Human Rights Versus Forced 
Migrants Law  
One might well question the relevance 
and the merits of the system of legal  
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protection granted to "forcibly dis-
placed persons" or forced migrants. In-
deed, when it involves persons who 
possess the status of Russian citizens, 
whether they have acquired that 
citizenship before or after their arrival 
on the territory of the Russian 
Federation, they should not be 
distinguished in any way from all the 
other citizens. They have the same 
legal status and therefore should be 
able to enjoy all the rights and privi-
leges conferred on them by such a 
status in conditions of ordinary law.  
As citizens, theybenefitfrom the pro-
tection of the Russian authorities both 
on the territory of the Russian Federa-
tion as well as abroad in the same way 
as would any other citizen. Maintaining 
the opposite would end in evaluating 
the concept of citizenship as defined in 
international law. Consequently, by 
granting such citizens a special status, 
the law has tended to confine them to a 
secondary status, treating them as 
though they were not complete citizens. 
Since they are Russian citizens, it is 
hard to see why they should be given 
the benefit of a special system for 
identification papers, protection against 
refoulement, and compensation for the 
loss of their belongings.  
On these grounds they have no need 
whatsoever for a derogation of ordinary 
law, but should be able to benefitfromit 
under the same conditions as any other 
citizens.  
In the case of foreigners allowed to 
reside legally on the territory of the 
Russian Federation and who have been 
forced to leave their usual place of resi-
dence' the granting of the status of" for-
cibly displaced person" does not have 
any justification either. Once they have 
been allowed to reside legally on the 
territory of the Russian Federation and 
as long as they continue to fulfil the 
conditions for legal residence, there is 
no reason why they should be taken 
into account and legalized.12 They 
should continue to benefit from the 
system of ordinary law applicable to 
foreigners allowed to reside on the 
territory of the Russian Federation. The 
fact that they are in a special situation, 
namely that they have been forced to 
leave their usual place of residence 
against their  
 
will, should compel the Russian au-
thorities to treat them as "internally dis-
placed persons" and provide them with 
the same assistance as that granted to 
Russian citizens placed in an identical 
predicament.  
The different categories of persons 
affected by the" forcibly displaced per-
son" law have no need whatsoever of a 
special system of legal protection. 
Therefore, they should be able to 
benefit from the legal protection of 
ordinary (law. While they do not need 
special protection they may, on the 
other hand, need specific assistance, the 
nature of which varies according to the 
conditions in which they have been 
displaced. Those who return to their 
country of origin for purely economic 
reasons and who no longer have any 
ties there, should be able to receive 
assistance to help them to integrate. 
Those who were victims of 
discrimination, who have had their 
human rights denied, or were caught in 
the midst of armed conflicts and have 
had to leave without being able to pre-
pare for their departure, often in dra-
matic conditions, should be able to 
receive a more constant and specific 
assistance.  
It is obvious that special provisions 
must be adopted by States confronted 
with such a phenomenon so as to allow 
the persons concerned to become inte-
grated in the country to which they re-
turned. On the other hand, there should 
be no need to create a specific legal cat-
egory.  
In the case of foreign nationals al-
lowed to reside legally on the territory 
of a State, and who are forced to leave 
their p lace of usual residence because 
of violence, armed conflicts or serious 
disturbances in law and order, they 
quite naturally fit in the category of the 
"internally displaced persons," that 
internationallaw defines.  
In the case of persons who are citi-
zens of the country to which they 
return, they should be considered either 
as "returning migrants," if they return 
for purely economic reasons or for 
personal ones, or as" returnees," if the 
reasons for their leaving are linked with 
armed conflicts, violations of human 
rights or serious disturbances in law 
and order in  
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their country of residence. These two 
existing categories, coming as they do 
under the general category of "migrants" 
should serve the task of establishing 
specific systems of assistance, yet they do 
not all imply any specific legal 
protection.  
In addition to being curtailed by fed-
eral norms of lower status, the rights 
guaranteed by federal law and the Con-
stitution are being eroded by regional 
regulations. A particularly prominent 
example of regional disregard for the 
human rights of forced migrants are the 
propiska regulations ("registration," to use 
the new terminology), i.e. residence 
permits required from individuals wishing 
to reside in a specific area in Russia.13 
Although Moscow has been particularly 
effective in undermining the rights of 
forced migrants through the use of strict 
propiska regulations, similar measures 
have been taken in several other cities 
and regions as well.14 In addition, some 
regions have openly violated federal laws 
by adopting rigid quota for forced 
migrants in their jurisdiction. Yet it is 
obvious that federal should take 
precedence when local rules are in 
conflict with it, but in practice that 
principle is often disregarded.15 In some 
cases, it is actually the gaps in and the 
outdated norms of federallaw that 
prompted local authorities to adopt their 
own, often restrictive, rules on forced 
migrants.  
Conclusion: The Need to Develop  
and Adopt a Draft Law on 
Repatriation  
Migration policy, which has been aimed 
at holding back Russians in the former 
Soviet republics, can end only in disaster. 
In areas that have a high concentration of 
Russian (such as northern Kazakhstan or 
Ukraine), it remains critical to help 
Russians preserve their culture and way 
of life.16 However, each person who links 
her /his fate to Russia must have the 
possibility of move in a civilized manner 
to Russia, which declared itself the 
successor state to the Soviet Union. 
Legislation today does not allow for such 
a possibility. Each migrant must prove 
that she/he (or all Russians) is a victim of 
discrimination  
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in his place of residence, which triggers a 
negative response from new independent 
States. A law guaranteeing support for 
voluntary migrants would fill the 
legislative vacuum in this area.  
Thus the forced migrant law is obvi-
ously not adapted to the gravity of the 
issue. Moreover, it appears to be opposed 
to human rights for being too dis-
criminatory. What can be the origin of 
the lack of political willingness within 
the Russian state-as shown by the en-
forced legal texts-when it comes to 
dealing with the problem of forced mi-
grants?  
Undoubtedly, Russian immigration is 
seen as a current economic and political 
burden rather than a future benefit. In 
addition to the costs of resettlement and 
higher unemployment, Russian 
immigrants have tended to throw their 
political support behind the most na-
tionalistic politicians and parties.  
Yet, this already serious issue, which 
is to become even graver in the coming 
years, might very well endanger the co-
hesion of the Russian State itself.  
Therefore, a repatriation law would 
deem useful, if properly enforced, per-
haps thanks to the International Com-
munity that could help the new Russian 
State by granting it the financial needs 
necessary to the enforcement of such a 
law .••  
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